A Comparison between the African philosophers Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyeke conceptions of personhood.

The entirety of modern human interaction occurs within the human construct of society, where social interactions are structured by how society has evolved dialectically with humans. The types of societal arrangements that have arisen to form the social structure provide a framework for the existence of individuals within the society. This framework has direct connotations on the manner in which people in the society define and conceptualize the idea of personhood. The conceptions of personhood are usually formed by the society's intellectuals, who raise questions that inquire into the metaphysical and moral nature of personhood. The metaphysical questions usually regard self-sufficiency, the communal nature of human existence, and whether or not the ontological priority of the community over the individual is true. The moral questions can be drawn from these metaphysical questions and concern the importance of individual rights and duties in relation to the interests of the community and whether or not a sense of commonality exists in human life. African social relations display characteristics of communal social arrangements. Because the social structure influences and reflects the conceptions of personhood in society, the implications of communitarianism of personhood were discussed by Kwame Gyeke (2000) and Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984). This essay will explore the assumptions, similarities, and differences between their resultant conclusions of personhood in African thought, by exploring Menkiti's view and then sharing how Gyeke's view may agree to certain aspects and finishing off by stating Gyeke's revised version of Menkiti's theory.

Menkiti's conception of personhood views the individual as rooted in the human community, such that to become a person, one must understand that community is embedded in the definition of themselves as a person. Menkiti states that African personhood is defined with reference to the environment and social circumstances created by the cultural community and that personhood's main features are based on their existence in the social community. From this, Menkiti implies that the existence of the community takes precedence over the existence of the individual and their rights (Menkiti, 1984: 171-175). Additionally, Menkiti mentions that personhood is achieved through a set of ritualized social steps that amount to being incorporated into the community and, therefore, truly becoming a person. He argues that individuals should actively attempt to achieve this position in the community through participation in communal life by taking moral responsibility for their actions and obligations to the community based on their role (Menkiti, 1984: 171-175). Obligations that place the community over individual rights. The main assumptions of Menkiti's communitarianism are that the individual's definition is bound in the community; the community defines personhood through ritual steps that can be failed at, therefore personhood is not automatically ascribed to individuals and that individuals and the community's growth are intertwined, and therefore, they have a moral duty to ensure their actions benefit the community (Menkiti, 1984: 171-175).

Kwame Gyeke (2002) concludes that Menkiti's view is overstated and difficult to support as it overemphasizes the role of the community in defining personhood and does not consider individual freedoms. However, similarities do occur between the two conceptions in the form of Gyeke agreeing with certain aspects of the assumptions drawn by Menkiti's radical communitarianism. Firstly, Gyeke accepts that humans are intrinsically communal beings because we are born into a context where social relations and social independence are a norm in society, and that social relations are defined by interpersonal bonds between members who have common values, interests, and goals. But he states that the self can be distanced from communal values and can revise them, therefore, personhood is not wholly defined by the community (Gyeke, 2000: 297-300). Secondly, Gyeke agrees that the moral responsibility of duties to the community is central to personhood, but it should not be detrimental to the individual's rights or conditions (Gyeke, 2000: 297-300). Thirdly, Gyeke agrees that when an individual can fail to meet the values and behavior standards the community holds to define personhood, but he states that this failure does not constitute a failure to attain personhood, as Menkiti would suggest, but it does have negative impacts on the individual's social status.

Gyeke offers his moderate communitarianism, which accommodates the values of individuality in addition to the communal values that make up a more appropriate account of the self. Gyeke states that an ethical theory that accounts for individuals' rights will gain more support. This conception of personhood claims that community is not the single universal method to acquire personhood; it incorporates communal values, social duties, and the rights of the individual and their responsibilities (Molefe, 2017: 2-4). Moderate communitarianism addresses this dual nature that seems to apply to individuals by stating that communal duties should be prioritized but not at the expense of individuals' rights (Molefe, 2017: 3). Gyeke's moderate communitarianism is more focused on other communal values compared to individual rights, but it does not exclude them, such that individual rights are built into the practices of communities. This means a person's actions should be towards benefiting the community as a matter of duty and morality (Gyeke, 2000: 307). This need for duty to community before self is based on social nature and its influence on our being, and due to this sociality, we live in a moral universe, and therefore, our morality would be based on our duties towards the community (Gyeke, 2000: 309-311).

The differences between the two conceptions of personhood are evident in Gyeke's belief that Menkiti has exaggerated the power and role of the cultural community by assuming it may have authority over the life decisions of its individual group members. This exaggeration leads to confusion about the actual nature of the community and, therefore, the conception of personhood. Additionally, Gyeke states that radical communitarianism always assumes the individual is wholly made by society, tends to cut the ability to pursue moral autonomy, assumes that the life of the person is dependent on the ends of the community, and negatively affects the individual's ability to analyze and choose values that they identify most with (Gyeke, 2000: 297-300).

Gyeke's moderate view is more relevant to the current status of African societies as recognition for individual rights would appeal to many more people. Some may argue that the implications of Gyeke's conception of personhood is that members can focus on individual rights too much and not feel obliged to ascribe to group-based actions. In reply, there must be a place for freedom of choice of lifestyle and certain values and actions that may not agree with group actions if the individual feels obliged to.

In conclusion, this essay has explored the assumptions, similarities, and differences between the conceptions of personhood in African thought as presented by Menkiti and Gyeke. Menkiti's radical communitarianism emphasizes the role of community in defining personhood and prioritizes communal values over individual rights. On the other hand, Gyeke's moderate communitarianism acknowledges the importance of both communal values and individual rights in defining personhood. While Menkiti's view may be seen as overstated, Gyeke's moderate view is more relevant to the current status of African societies as it recognizes the importance of individual rights. It is important to note that both Menkiti and Gyeke agree that moral responsibility to the community is central to personhood, but it should not be detrimental to the individual's rights or conditions. Overall, this essay highlights the complexity and nuances of the concept of personhood in African thought and the need for a balance between communal values and individual rights.

The original final draft can be found here 👉Philosophy 2A

References

Gyeke, K., 2000. Person and community in African thought. Philosophy from Africa, pp. 297-312.

Menkiti, I.A., 1984. Person and community in African traditional thought. African philosophy: An introduction, 3, pp.171-182.

Molefe, M., 2017. Critical comments on Afro-communitarianism: the community versus the individual. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 6(1), pp.1-22.