The original final draft can be found here 👉Philosophy 2A: Kai Horsthemke & Edwin Etieyibo

Kai Horsthemke (2017) states that the moral perceptions, world view, and attitudes of African people remain anthropocentric in nature. He comes to this conclusion by examining the status of animals in religion, philosophical thought, and traditions. From the results of this analysis, he claims that although African values do include non-human beings, they are seen to have no rights and any human duties to these creatures are to be seen merely as indirectly benefiting humans and are ascribed to them purely by the functional status they hold in the human world. Horsthemke states that African morality emphasizes respect for non-human beings in relation to their special relationships with specific animals. African ethics stress the interconnectedness that exists between humans and nature, which alludes to the fact that this respect is again indirectly associated with the animals as it is based on their relation with humans. Conversely, Edwin Etieyibo (2017) believes that Horsthemke's assumption of African worldviews as anthropocentric is not entirely correct. He claims that if the African scholars used by Horsthemke are more closely investigated, along with his type of worldview that he ascribes to defining African worldviews, the result may be different from anthropocentrism, but may rather be closer to biocentrism or ecocentrism. This essay will discuss both articles' assumptions about whether or not African philosophical thought and values towards animals are anthropocentric by understanding the specific reasons for each author's conclusion.

Horsthemke describes how African morality links to ancestors and nature, as Africans believe in the conservation and respect for certain parts of nature, but says that this respect has its origin in the ultimate goal of serving humanity only. Horsthemke believes this respect for nature is based on human-centered ideologies and is founded more so in fear of divine punishment instead of actual empathy towards nature. (Horsthemke, 2017:123-124) He states that although African worldview believes the land to be sacred and part of their connection to the ancestors, the living use the resources solely for their benefit, which is an anthropocentric characteristic. Another anthropocentric characteristic Horsthemke believes exists in African values is the placing of non-human beings in an inferior position to humans in the African hierarchy of beings, despite their lack of involvement in the apparent immoral condition we find ourselves in. This then leads to the fact that the duties to those above human are direct duties, while the duties to those who are apparently subordinate to humans are indirect. (Horsthemke, 2017:124-125)

Secondly, Horsthemke brings up animal slaughtering as a part of traditional rituals and customs of African's as being anthropocentric, as the cultural rights of the people are put before the concerns about cruelty against the animal. (Horsthemke, 2017:126) Horsthemke believes that the laws that sanction animal slaughter are contradictory as they call for humane killing in which the animal does not suffer, but he states this to be impossible as the animals' pain may be seen to be worse than we as humans perceive it to be, as they cannot rationalize the reasons for their sacrifice. Therefore, the anxiety and pain the animals endure from these animal slaughter rituals could be described as worse than human pain, and there is no link to any scientific principles that prove the animals' suffering is the satisfaction of the ancestors' wishes. (Horsthemke, 2017:127-128) Along with their sacrificial value, Horsthemke believes other instances further prove that animals' value is being determined by their use by humans, like domestic animals valued for food, as a monetary system, are different from the value ascribed to wild animals for the pelts and other uses not attributed to domestic animals. (Horsthemke, 2017:129-130)

Horsthemke explains that he views African ideas like Ubuntu as anthropocentric, as when describing the relation between humans and nature, they define animals and ecosystems in terms of human ends. He claims that Ubuntu does not directly have concern for animals and that our duties to them cannot be direct as they lack humanness and because they only exist in the physical realm, they lack the mental capacity for subjectivity and therefore, do not and cannot participate in morality and cannot be seen as moral agents or recipients. (Horsthemke, 2017:133-135)

On the other hand, Edwin Etieyibo (2017) understands Kai Horsthemke's conception of African worldviews as anthropocentric, as he describes them to be a human-centered worldview that is important in assigning a value that is atypically special to humans. Following from this, non-human animals' intrinsic value is compared to humans' qualities and moral status. Etieyibo believes this understanding of anthropocentrism offered by Horsthemke is basic in its grasp of the actual nature of anthropocentrism. From this understanding, he seems to imply that African views on animal morality stem purely from their relations with human beings. Anthropocentrism actually contains more diverse classification criteria that include humans' sought after position in the natural order; the ontological and existential gap between humans and animals; and the view that humans are the only proponents of the moral framework that exists. Therefore, building on these criteria, it follows that humans are the only beings that belong to these criteria and are the only beings that have intrinsic value, but this is not true of African worldviews. (Etieyibo, 2017:148)

Etieyibo sees the first main foundation of Horsthemke's argument as regarding the African hierarchy of beings. Etieyibo claims that Horsthemke is right in concluding that human communities are above animals as God and the ancestors are above humans, but that he is wrong in assuming that this means that animals do not have intrinsic value and that this implies anthropocentrism to African worldviews. According to Etieyibo, Horsthemke does not show that the African hierarchy of beings is committed to a conception that places a divide between humans and non-human animals and sees this as enough to say that either humans are the most important holders of morality or that non-human animals have no intrinsic value. Furthermore, another critique offered by Etieyibo is that the African hierarchy of beings actually has very little to do with the manner in which value is ascribed to animate beings. (Etieyibo, 2017:152-153)

A second main foundation of Horsthemke's argument is the traditional customs and rituals of animal slaughter practiced by many African cultures. Horsthemke believes that these rituals are to be seen as anthropocentric and that the values ascribed to slaughtered animals are determined by the function or purpose their sacrifice brings to humans. Etieyibo believes this view is mistaken, as animal slaughter is not anthropocentric. He states that when an animal is killed, a connection with God, the ancestors' spirits is created, which involves God, ancestor's spirits, and all natural life. Animal slaughter is in the interest of promoting the community's outcomes. These animals are being slaughtered to ensure all constituents of this community, humans, exist in are benefitted. This benefiting extends to passed humans only, and this is why Etieyibo believes it is mistaken to say that animals have no intrinsic value because they are slaughtered by humans in African customs and rituals and mistaken to assume this constitutes anthropocentrism to African worldviews. This view that animal slaughter is in the interest of the community can be seen as a referent of African worldviews to biocentric and ecocentric worldviews rather than anthropocentric, as both views would be in approval of animal slaughter, in order to promote the lives of the ecosystem or community. (Etieyibo, 2017:156-157)

Based on the reasons offered by both authors, I personally disagree with Horsthemke's idea that African worldviews are anthropocentric and instead agree with Edwin Etieyibo's notion that, if African scholars are analyzed more closely, one may instead conclude that they are closer to biocentrism or ecocentrism (Etieyibo.,2017:155). This agreement with Etieyibo stems from the fact that, even if the hierarchy of beings is ordered in terms of superiority and inferiority, any being ordered may still have intrinsic value, which means that such an ordering does not imply the rejection of intrinsic value (Etieyibo.,2017:155). Secondly, Horsthemke himself acknowledges the connection between the spiritual world and natural world and the interconnectedness that exists between all beings (Etieyibo.,2017:155). Based on this, Etieyibo believes that Horsthemke should have concluded that African worldviews are closer to biocentrism or ecocentrism, rather than anthropocentrism, as there is no division between humans and non-human animals and all beings are connected and therefore have ascribed value (Etieyibo.,2017:155). Etieyibo suggests that a better strategy for determining African values towards animals would be to understand the ontological beliefs in African worldviews and compare the results of this critical analysis to the ontological underpinnings associated with anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism, and then determine which one most suits the commitments discovered to be inherent in African worldviews. If Horsthemke had done this, he would have concluded that African worldviews are further from anthropocentrism than he originally thought.